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"Law and Economics is at aforkin the road," says Richard Epstein, professor
of law at the University of Chicago and an advocate of the controversial and
influential movement in legal studies. As usual, Epstein's analysis is conservative. Law and Economics has entered a five-tiered cloverleaf where two expressways, two major arteries, and the international airport spur all join.
Twenty years ago, L a w and Economics—the application of market-oriented
economics to the law—was still considered a crackpot theory espoused by
neo-reactionaries in Hyde Park. These days even its harshest critics say Law
and Economics is the most cogent and influential legal theory that exists.
Along the way, Law and Economics has found advocates, practitioners, and
sympathetic ears in the Reagan and Bush administrations, and gained a solid
beachhead on the federal bench, including the 1986 appointment of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.
It has become an influential part of the curriculum at top law schools: All
major law schools have at least one person teaching the discipline; most have
several. A n d where there is no L a w and Economics instruction, it is not for
lack of interest. "We've been trying to find the right person to teach Law and
Economics for a couple of years now," admits a chaired law professor at a
second-tier university. "If a law school doesn't have one, it's looking for one."
Indeed, a knowledge of economics has become a must for legal scholars. "In
academic discourse," says Epstein, the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor in the L a w School, "those people w h o can't do economic analysis are at a tremendous disadvantage." Daniel Fischel, JD'77, w h o from January 1984 until this pastjune was director of the U of C's L a w and Economics
program, goes further: "It's impossible to be considered a serious scholar in a

ONCE CONSIDERED
A CRACKPOT THEORY,
IT'S N O W TAUGHT AT MAJOR
LAW SCHOOLS, HAS
ADVOCATES ON THE

FEDERAL BENCH, AND IS PART
OF THE MAINSTREAM OF
AMERICAN LEGAL LIFE. BUT
LAW AND ECONOMICSA CONTROVERSIAL
MOVEMENT WITH DEEP
CHICAGO ROOTS
-IS CHANGING ITS O W N
DIRECTION.

field without integrating Law and Economics into your work."
In the courts, Law and Economics got its biggest boost w h e n Ronald Reagan
was elected president. As an offshoot of the intellectual grounding for
Reagan's belief in the sanctity of self-interest in open and free markets, the
theory fit Reaganomics like a glove. By the mid-1980s, Law and Economics
became the legal expression of the Reagan administration's economic theories, and seemed destined to sweep aside all competing theories on its way to
the Supreme Court.
Nowhere did the Law and Economics approach become stronger than on
the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago, where U of C law professor Richard Posner was appointed in 1981, to be joined four years later by
his U of C colleague Frank Easterbrook, JD'73. During the mid-1980s,
staunch Law and Economics advocates, including Posner, were repeatedly
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mentioned as possible Supreme Court nominees, along with such fellow travelers as Robert Bork, AB'48, JD'53; Yale University's
Ralph Winter, Jr. (a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Connecticut); and
Antonin Scalia. Indeed, Reagan nominated
one ardent L a w and Economics advocate,
Douglas Ginsburg, JD'73, to the high court,
but press accounts of his marijuana use cut
short political debates on the merits of the economic analysis of the law.
A s a sure sign that the theory has joined the
mainstream—some would say a sure sign of
its impending decline—thefirstmeeting of
the American L a w and Economics Association was held this spring.
At the center of Law and Economics are the theories of
A d a m Smith, as amplified
by such University of Chicago luminaries as Nobel
Prize-winning economists
Milton Friedman, A M ' 3 3 , and George
Stigler, PhD'38, as well as Gary Becker,
A M ' 5 3 , PhD'55, w h o many say is a future
laureate. These economists hold that individuals make choices and decisions in a rational
manner. Thus, the most efficient way to order
society is to let all those rational maximizers
buy, sell, and barter in a free and open market.
In the aggregate, their argument goes, fostering self-interest is the most efficient way
for society to increase its total wealth. L a w
and Economics applies such thinking to nonmarket areas of public policy actions—and
hence to nearly all areas of the law itself.
Although early theorists laid some groundwork. L a w and Economics developed into a
defined, coherent philosophy at Chicago,
where in the late 1930s the L a w School was
thefirstto appoint an economist to its faculty
(Henry Simons, in 1939). With the arrival of
Aaron Director in 1946, economic analysis of
the law became a formal discipline. Director
began thefirstL a w and Economics program
in the nation and in 1958 founded the Journal
of Law and Economics, still published on
campus. Director, a highly conservative
thinker w h o has specialized in antitrust law,
set the tone at the U of C by using microeconomic principles—what later became the
"Chicago School" of economics approach—
to analyze business practices in antitrust law.
The first generation of scholars, most of
w h o m taught at the University, concentrated
on corporation, antitrust, and contract l a w —
those areas of business law where market be-

havior has obvious applications. "In antitrust ond generation of the theory's practitioners.
law, it is practically inevitable to use econom- Coase, the Clifton R. Musser Professor
ics," notes antitrust specialist Diane W o o d , Emeritus in the L a w School, has published
associate dean of the L a w School. "It's a mat- extensively and influentially, but by far his
most cited work was a seminal article
ter of whose economics you're using."
In the mid- 1970s, two antitrust cases— U. S. published in 1960 and entitled "The Problem
v. General Dynamics and Continental T. V.,of Social Cost." In the article, Coase argued
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania IMN—began to changethat the responsibility for preventing accithe way antitrust cases were decided. Before dents should be borne by the party that incurs
the 1974 General Dynamics case, any move- the lowest cost to society as a whole.
ment towards consolidation of a marketA s an example, he used a hypothetical situasuch as when two competitors m e r g e — w a s tion: Sparks from a railroad engine alight on
considered inherently to reduce competition. forested private property next to the railroad
Similarly, before the Sylvania case in 1977, a right-of-way. A fire results. Who's at fault?
manufacturer's attempts to dictate terms, such Coase ignored the central question of liability
as setting prices or mapping out exclusive ter- law, arguing instead that both the railroad and
ritories for their retail outlets, were viewed as the landowner's forest had "caused" the fire;
a form of vertical monopoly that would re- thus, if the cost to society of cutting down the
duce competition among dealers.
trees near the tracks would be less than the
But under the influence of L a w and Eco- cost (in higher train fares) of mandating safety
nomics analysis, both of these antitrust tru- devices, then the responsibility for preventing
the accident should be the landowner's.
Although Coase's argument did not win over
liability law, which seeks to place blame for
liability judgments, and juries routinely ignore it when assessing fault, he had introduced economic analysis to realms where
market forces are less intuitively obvious. A s
other scholars joined Coase in analyzing the
way that policy decisions, as reflected in the
law, affected society's ability to maximize
wealth, the University of Chicago became the
center of what Douglas Baird, the Harry A .
Bigelow Professor of L a w and since July 1 the
director of the U of C's L a w and Economics
program, calls a "revolution that has changed
the teaching of law."

SECOND
GENERATION OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS
SCHOLARS EXPANDED
For after Coase came the deluge. A second, and hugely
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO
more controversial generation
of scholars—including Posner,
EVERY AREA OF LEGAL
Esptein, Fischel, and the L a w
DEBATE.
School's current Clifton R.

isms were broken. Believing that what happens in the market is of primary importance,
legal scholars, judges, and regulators began to
focus less on the market share or internal
structure of a merged or individual company
— a n d paid more attention to the effect of a
company's actions on the market place. O n e
result was a willingness to allow mergers that
increased market share, as long as the markets
remained competitive. In addition, courts
gave producers more leeway in dictating to retail outlets the marketing of their products.
Tlieodore P. Roth, who has worked for Time By the early 1960s, L a w and Economics
and Adwetk magazines, was a Chicago free- scholars at Chicago were already looking belance writer until July, when he became the yond antitrust questions. Ronald Coase, w h o
business editor of the Columbia (Missouri) joined the faculty in 1964, came to serve as a
transitionary figure between thefirstand secDaily Tribune.
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Musser Professor of Economics, William
Landes—confidently expanded economic
analysis to every arena of legal debateincluding freedom of speech, family law, and
anti-discrimination statutes.
A s the most prominent and prolific of L a w
and Economics' second generation, Richard
Posner did more than anyone else to move the
field out of H y d e Park (where he arrived in
1969 as a professor of law) and into other universities and the courts. Employing a simple,
market-driven economic model, Posner
marched through the law, applying it to nearly
every discipline—and telling scholars in myriad fields that they have spent their lives looking at their specialties in the wrong way.
Posner argues that he uses economics in a
normative way, to determine the costs of a particular public policy decision, but not to decide on economic grounds if the policy should

be followed or not. "I think m y emphasis," he
says, " has been on using economics to explain
the structure of legal rules and institutions,
rather than on using it to change behavior."
Few of Posner's critics, however, would agree
with this assessment, and the reason has m u c h
to do with the sorts of policy debate he is willing to enter.
Perhaps his most controversial piece of
work has been his 1984 suggestion that restrictive and complex adoption procedures
have had the same result as any other price
ceiling: They have "produced shortages,
queues, and a black market." Both legal
scholars and the popular press were shocked
at what they saw as an implication of Posner's
suggestion: "Meet Richard Posner," went the
headline of an article in the Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, "the Judge W h o
Would Sell Homeless Babies."
Actually, Posner never suggested selling babies. H e didn't, he says, because of people's
high emotional resistance to such an idea, a
resistance he sees in terms of costs versus benefits: "The untoward consequences of such
types of price regulation have to be balanced
against the benefits," he says, adding, "I don't
see the benefits" of the current adoption system, but he acknowledges that there are m a n y
"people for w h o m the idea of a price tag on
babies has a horrible symbolic resonance. I
can't really quarrel with them if that's h o w
they feel."
In a current work in progress, a book analyzing the legal regulation of sexuality, Posner
takes on another highly charged issue. Looking at rape through a cost-benefit prism, he
postulates that the main reason rapists commit their crime is because of low social skills:
It is so difficult for them to find a traditional
mate that they substitute rape for normal sexual satisfaction.
A s Richard Epstein notes, "This isn't the
sort of stuff that A d a m Smith has m u c h to say
about," and it is the type of argument that
brings disagreement even from those w h o are
often staunch allies of the L a w and Economics approach.
But it is not only Posner's more
provocative theorizing that has
garnered L a w and Economics
critics as well as converts. The
area where the approach meets
its most stubborn resistance
may well be when it is applied to Constitutional guarantees of personal freedoms. What, the
critics ask, do free-market values have to do
with free speech?
"If you believe, as I do, that free speech has
infinite value, h o w do you justify constraining
speech because it's too expensive?" asks
David Goldberger, AB'63, JD'67, past legal
director of the Chicago office of the American

professor Mary Becker, JD'80. "Making
society wealthier doesn't justify white m e n
having such a large piece of the pie."
Such a critique is not disputed by L a w and
Economics thinkers. "Economists," admits
Posner, "tend to accept the unequal distribution of income as a given, rather than examine
it critically."
The same can also be said of L a w and Economics, its critics claim. " L a w and Economics was presented as an empirical proposition," says M a r k K e l m a n of Stanford
University L a w School, "but it was largely a
political myth that simple rules can give us
definite answers." "It's not as scientific as it
pretends," agrees William Marshall, JD'77,
w h o teaches law at Case Western Reserve
University. "It's as political as saying w e
should distribute wealth."
Despite such objections, L a w and Economics has earned a large place in legal studies.
" L a w and Economics is very useful," notes
M a r y Becker, "when used in a normative
way, to see the effect on incentives and adjust
fork."
In fact, even critics of the approach borrow
from the discipline. "In some ways I do economics, " admits as harsh a critic as Stanford's
Kelman. A n d the U of C's Becker says that in
her specialty of family law, L a w and Economics has m u c h to contribute. For example,
she notes, it is helpful to think about the incentives—or the lack of incentives—that society
A W AND
provides for w o m e n w h o want to be homeECONOMICS, SAYS ONE makers and mothers.
"Economics is a powerful way of ordering
CRITIC, IS "LARGELY
complex reality," agrees John Donohue, a
Northwestern University law professor w h o
A POLITICAL MYTH
will be a visiting professor at the U of C this
fall. "Inthehandsofaskilledperson, w h o u nTHAT SIMPLE RULES
derstands the assumptions he or she brings in,
it can be an unbiased method of analysis."
CAN GIVE US DEFINITE
Still, the reach of the theory seems to be
ANSWERS."
slowing. In the courts, for example, the appointment of L a w and Economics judges may
have reached its zenith in the mid-1980s,
and it seems unlikely that any L a w and Ecotonomous and self-sufficient consumers, un- nomics zealot will be appointed to the Suderestimates individuals' resistance to exploi- preme Court in the near future (Scalia, a fortation. "The description of h u m a n motivation mer U of C instructor, applies L a w and Ecoon which L a w and Economics rests is sim- nomics to business areas, where there is little
plistic and weak," contends Robin West, a controversy).
University of Maryland law professor w h o
This glass ceiling may be largely a result of
was a visiting professor at Chicago in the bitterness created during the Robert Bork
1988-89. West believes that economics does hearings in September 1987. Bork's views on
not allow either for altruism or for the equally balancing rights, fears that he would restrict
h u m a n inclination to act submissively to abortion and turn back civil rights law, and his
please superiors. "The act of giving con- willingness to think in terms of maximizing
sent," she points out, "does not necessarily society's wealth had m u c h to do with the "cold
maximize self-interest."
and uncaring" criticisms that helped block
Other critics argue that the theory generally his Supreme Court nomination.
says nothing about the way society's wealth is
Moreover, in the popular mind. L a w and
distributed. "Efficiency arguments tend to Economics has been tarred by the same brush
justify existing inequities," notes U of C law as the excesses of the Reagan years—the ele-

Civil Liberties Union and n o w an Ohio State
University law professor specializing in First
A m e n d m e n t issues.
"I don't think anyone thinks free speech has
infinite value," Posner rejoins. "Most people
support some restrictions," he adds, pointing
to the Supreme Court's "clear and present
danger" test for free speech. That test, he argues, is basically an economic formulation.
Indeed, there are those w h o place a high
price on civil liberties and see the usefulness
of a L a w and Economics approach. According to M a r k Tushnet, a Constitutional law
expert at Georgetown University, the approach "makes the best case when it joins
feminist anti-pornography arguments," asserting that the cost to society of allowing such
types of free speech is higher than the dubious
benefits gained.
Other critics object that the L a w and Economics approach, with its insistence on au-
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vation of self-interest that brought the country
the Savings and Loan debacle, junk bonds,
and insider-trading scandals. "What happened with the S & L s had nothing to do with
L a w and Economics," contends William
Landes. "That was a failure by Congress to
understand basic economic principles."
Even so, it's extremely unlikely that a L a w
and Economics judge—particularly Richard
Posner—will be nominated to the Supreme
Court in the near future. While the liberal side
of the aisle might be expected to oppose him,
some of the judge's views, such as those on
adoption, have also succeeded in undermining the support of the political right. Neil K o mesar, AB'63, A M ' 6 4 , JD'67, and PhD'73,
the Doyle-Bascom Professor of L a w at the
University of Wisconsin at Madison and a former student of Posner's, puts it succinctly:
"He's Bork in spades."
Posner himself shows distaste at the idea of a
Senate grilling: "It would be an extremely repulsive process." Noting the extent of his
scholarly output, he adds with more than a
hint of sarcasm, "I don't think there's a machinery for processing that m u c h writing
through the Congressional intellect."
Despite being blocked from the courts' highest level, L a w and Economics will have a
growing impact. But rather than being overt—
as when expansive and controversial advocates
take judicial appointments—its future effect
will be subtle and pervasive. The reason for
this is the natural delay between law school instruction and the legal institutions. Recent
graduates from the best law schools have all
been taught some economic theory. A s they become top lawyers, regulators, and judges, the
courts will, it seems likely, become more receptive to economic arguments.
What Law and Economics says in the future—and h o w it says
it—is the most important issue facing
the discipline. A s economics itself became more complex, L a w
and Economics scholars have turned increasingly to complex arguments to make their
case. Such specialized mathematical analysis
raises the amount of knowledge a reader
needs in order to understand the material,
making it less likely it will reach a wide audience. A n d sweeping analyses of whole areas
of the law become difficult. A s more detailed
analysis is needed to make a point, the arguments become narrower.
In addition, the movement's political slant is
no longer monolithic. What began as a highly
conservative theory is now used by scholars
across the political spectrum. "There's nothing inherently conservative about L a w and
Economics as a discipline," says Geoffrey
32

Miller, the Kirkland and Ellis Professor in the L a w and Economicsfieldis using new methods to push into areas where classic market
L a w School.
Even so, the movement retains a distinctive- theory is deemed insufficient.
Take g a m e theory—in which decisions by
ly conservative cast. "There's a scientific aura
that attracts more conservative thinkers," one person affect the decisions of others—and
notes Georgetown's M a r k Tushnet. "In order its applications to labor law. In a perfectly free
to avoid the right-wing political twist," says market, workers could quit their jobs and go
Tushnet, more liberal scholars have found it elsewhere if they weren't getting what they
"necessary to make the underlying economic wanted, and owners could hire different
model increasingly complicated." A m o n g workers if their current employees refused to
the third generation of L a w and Economics meet demands. But in reality, as the use of
scholars, that is exactly what has happened. game theory acknowledges, workers have
This development has received mixed re- seniority, retirement, and homes tied to the
views from m a n y in thefield.S o m e scholars company they work for, while the owners face
do consider it progress to have a more sophis- job actions, strikes, and the costs of training a
ticated and detailed discussion, which pre- new work force.
sumedly better reflects the real world. "I used At Chicago, Douglas Baird and Randal
to be the only one talking about bankruptcy Picker are using g a m e theory to examine how
laws in economic terms," notes Chicago's the management of companies and their
Douglas Baird. " N o w there's a lot of good shareholders negotiate a company's emerpeople saying interesting and complicated gence from bankruptcy, while Professor Alan
things." But others remain dubious about the Sykes is doing work in international trade law
to determine h o w well various approaches to
new generation's complex formulae.
"There's a sense in which the mathematical foreign trade negotiations work.
models become exceedingly elegant," says
Richard Epstein, " but there's a danger of it be- While acceptance of
L a w and Economics
ing merely creative mathematics." O n e trend
theory has spread
in thefield,for example, is that many young
through legal and acL a w and Economics scholars now earn both
a J.D degree and a Ph.D. in economics.
ademic circles, the
Richard Posner is not certain this is a benefiultimate roadblock to
cial change. "I think it will probably help the its success may prove to be the public itself. A
field," he says. "However, I'd hate to see the political debate over L a w and Economics was
field confined to people w h o are willing to un- cut short when the Ginsburg nomination
dergo that m u c h post-graduate education."
foundered. But as thefieldbecomes more and
Perhaps the most obvious sign that L a w and more influential in the courts—even in a subEconomics will become increasingly com- tle w a y — a public debate over the theory may
plex and scholarly is the creation of the Amer- break out. Such a debate will likely be emoican L a w and Economics Association, which tionally freighted.
held itsfirstmeeting in late spring. At the con- O n one side will be those w h o have a viscervention, in Champaign, 111., more than 200 of al response to the L a w and Economics apthe Association's 400 members met to assess proach, feeling that the calculated, cool lanthe state of their art.
guage of economics is inappropriate when
Despite the greater number of voices, and talking about certain issues. To such people,
the wider range of opinions that number im- L a w and Economics, and its academic applies, the m o o d was "pretty bullish," says proach to social problems, seems to reside in a
Randal Picker, AB'80, A M ' 8 2 , JD'85, an as- different world, one that places the bottom
sistant professor of law at Chicago. "The con- line above all else.
ference was very upbeat," confirms Landes,
In academia, however, a scholar like Douglas
president-elect of the organization. Landes Baird, w h o recognizes the limits of economic
(who, after 15 years as editor of the Journal of analysis, is more than optimistic, he is certain:
Law and Economics, now edits the Journal of " L a w and Economics is the future. There will
Legal Studies) was pleased by the young age be some brush skirmishes between the past and
of the participants, which promises a bright the future, but the future is going to win."
future for L a w and Economics in academia.
Case Western's William Marshall, w h o
Perhaps the prime reason for the confidence claims that his study of economics while reis that despite its growing complexities and ceiving his law degree at the U of C only mad e
nuances, L a w and Economics remains the him better able to criticize the discipline, is
most coherent approach to the law. Put sim- appreciative of what L a w and Economics has
ply, it takes a theory to beat a theory. "Its com- done, but hopes Baird is wrong, especially
petition is extraordinarily weak," says the when it comes to the courts. " L a w and EcoUniversity of Wisconsin's Neil Komesar. nomics has m a de terrific contributions to de"There's no other cogent theory out there."
bates across the board," admits Marshall. "I
A final reason for the confidence is that the don't want it to win, but I'm glad it entered."
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